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2021 Afar Flood Response Case Study

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Acronyms

ARFTF	Afar Regional Flood Task Force
BRE	Building a Resilient Ethiopia
CARE	Care International
CVCA	Climate Vulnerability and Capacity Analysis
DE	Developmental Evaluation
DPFSPCO	Disaster Prevention and Food Security Program Coordination Office
DPPC	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (former name of the Regional Disaster Prevention and Food Security Program Coordination Office)
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRM-CB	Disaster Risk Management Capacity Building Activity
ECC	Emergency Coordination Centers
EDRMC	Ethiopian Disaster Risk Management Commission
EQ	Evaluation Question
EWI	Early Warning
EWI	Early Warning Information
GIZ	German Society for International Cooperation
GOE	Government of Ethiopia
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IP	Implementing Partner
KII	Key Informant Interview
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning
NFI	Non-food Items
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NIMS	The National Disaster Risk Management Commission
NIMS	National Incident Management System

PSE	Private Sector Entity
PSNP	The Productive Safety Net Program
PSP	Participatory Scenario Planning
PYL	Professionalization and Youth Leadership Activity
R2	The Resilience and Relief Office
RiPA	The Resilience in Pastoral Areas Activities
RDM	Regional Disaster Mitigation Office
RRF	Risk Reduction Factor
RRM	Risk Reduction Measure
SAVE	Save the Children International
SDRM-SI	Strengthening Disaster Risk Management Systems and Institutions
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID	The United States Agency for International Development

Executive Summary

Introduction

Ethiopia has been facing a higher frequency and intensity of disasters due to long-term environmental degradation and shifting global weather patterns, increasingly exacerbated by climate change. Within this context, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Ethiopia is carrying out the Resilience In Pastoral Areas (RiPA) North Program, implemented by MercyCorps. RiPA North seeks to build community resilience in the pastoral lowlands of Ethiopia. One of the program's core components is, "Improved Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Systems." Under this component, RiPA North engages with different task forces to support the Government of Ethiopia (GOE) in facilitating these groups to become action-oriented, joint planning bodies to better prepare for and respond to shocks.

RiPA North has participated in the Afar Regional Flood Task Force (ARFTF) since early 2020. The ARFTF consists of government officials, community leaders, RiPA North staff, other development actors, and private sector entities. In 2021, the Task Force took early action to address the flooding in Afar, including joint DRM system-strengthening action planning; helping the GOE with task management, budget allocation, and implementation of DRM; strengthening early warning systems; and improving coordination and communication among DRM actors. As a result of this enhanced response, early indications were that the flooding from the 2021 kiremt season was less devastating than the 2020 kiremt season.

Anticipating the predicted severity of climate shocks of the La Niña season (June to September 2022), USAID wanted to learn from the ARFTF's approach to the 2021 kiremt season given its perceived effectiveness. Therefore, this evaluative effort pursued the following two objectives: 1) to help USAID better understand why this particular flood response was effective, how it was implemented, and what its challenges were to potentially replicate and share these lessons with others who are in a position to adapt and improve future climate shock response efforts; and 2) to inform USAID's La Niña imminent intervention designs and budget decisions and help other regional Development Actors and implementing partners learn and leverage learnings to inform future flood roadmaps.

Evaluation Questions

The underpinning evaluation questions (EQs) for this effort come from USAID's desire to better understand how and why this particular climate shock response was effective and identify the stakeholders' contributions to the response. In addition to the overarching Developmental Evaluation DE Learning Question(s) that led to this effort, the four main evaluation questions this study seeks to answer are:

1. Why was the proactive Flood Task Force response carried out in the Afar Region ahead of the 2021 kiremt season effective compared to previous flood early action and responses in the region?
2. What roles did the GOE, USAID's RiPA North (Mercy Corps/CARE), community leaders, private sector, and others each play in generating the effective response?
3. Why did some households choose to relocate while others did not?
4. What financial factors and other contributions were important to the success of this flood response (e.g., budget cycle, timeliness of funds, contributions from the GOE et al, etc.)?

Methods

This evaluative effort used a Positive Deviance evaluative approach. Through an in-depth data collection and analysis effort, Positive Deviance enables understanding of how innovative solutions to development challenges interact with the implementing context, what capacities and other influencing variables are needed for successful and sustained application, and how these solutions may be successfully replicated in other contexts. This design was chosen because USAID/Ethiopia selected the flood task response as a successful "bright spot" that it would like to better understand for learning and potential replication. The evaluation team conducted a document review of secondary documents from USAID, implementing partners (IPs), and other stakeholders, interviewed 70 key informants from four of the seven RiPA North targeted Woredas located closest to the river, where households were at greatest risk from the floods (Mili, Afambo, Dubtu, and Asayita), and hosted a validation workshop with USAID/Ethiopia and MercyCorps.

Summary of Findings & Conclusions

The evidence clearly identified notable improvements in the 2021 Afar flood response compared to past seasons, including improved coordination, preventative measures, and evacuation. Specifically, the Task Force conducted wider and earlier early warning (EW) communications and prevention work and relocated a larger number of households than in years past, resulting in an overall reduction of immediate flood damage, including the saving of lives and assets. According to stakeholders interviewed for this evaluative effort, the most pivotal parts of the Task Force's flood response process were the early warning information dissemination, the community engagement and awareness efforts, and the pre-flood maintenance on waterways. The findings also highlighted several significant challenges that limited the positive impact of this intervention. Not all flood-affected households were adequately informed, either not receiving any EW communications or seeing flood-prevention efforts. Additionally, though the relocation efforts were initially successful, many relocation plans did not include a strategy for properly supporting internally displaced people (IDPs) with food and non-food items (NFIs) at relocation centers or support to return to their homes, meaning that suffering was not entirely mitigated, just delayed.

This evaluative effort concluded that the 2021 Afar Flood Task Force served as an improved, multi-stakeholder coordination platform, in concert with the regional Emergency Coordination Center (ECC), with many stakeholders actively engaged throughout the response. International development partners, including multiple United Nations (UN) agencies and RiPA North partners, played a significant role in pre-flood interventions, such as facilitating joint action and systems-based scenario planning. Community leaders were critical stakeholders throughout the ARFTF work, as they brought improved contextual and cultural awareness and were better able to reach and influence households towards early action. Meanwhile, the financial burden of the 2021 Afar flood response was split amongst development actors, with RiPA North playing a moderate role and the GOE playing a more substantial role than in previous years. The GOE, ECC, and the Flood Task Force led, coordinated, and managed the financial resources together, creating an enabling environment for reducing resource duplication and using resources strategically.

In general, stakeholders had a very good understanding of why households decided to relocate or not ahead of the flood. However, this evaluative effort revealed a data quality issue that many households who were considered to "have relocated" actually moved either during or after the flood out of necessity, rather than the proactive reasons ARFTF stakeholders believed. Households that did proactively relocate were primarily motivated to do so to preserve their lives and belongings and avoid the negative experiences they have had during past floods. Meanwhile, households that decided not to relocate stated a lack of awareness of the severity of the flood, but also more saliently, a lack of awareness of a relocation site and/or the adequacy of the site's services inhibited them from making an informed decision about whether or not to relocate.

In addition to households who benefited from relocation, many relocated households indicated a lack of support and difficult conditions at the relocation sites. While they may be alive, many of them lost their entire livelihoods, still cannot return to their original location, and are now dependent on the government for food and supplies, with many suffering from hunger and even death from starvation. This begs the question of whether households are actually better off if they decided to relocate ahead of the flood per the Flood Task Force's guidance or not with more durable solutions in place?

Prioritized Recommendations

1. All involved in climate shock responses should examine the situation of those who relocated to relocation sites in this Afar case study, as well as other recent relocation efforts, to better understand relocated households' realities on the ground and the disconnect between emergency response and durable solutions. For Afar specifically, the Flood Task Force should mobilize and deploy the needed resources to remediate any current suffering. Overarchingly, a deeper and expedited interrogation into relocation as a primary response mechanism is warranted ahead of anticipated climate shocks in Ethiopia to truly prevent and mitigate versus delay suffering of vulnerable populations and to ensure the most effective use of limited response funds.

2. The Flood Task Force, and other disaster prevention stakeholders must build upon the ARFTF's approach to planning efforts and A) take an increasingly hyper-localized approach, and B) ensure response design holistically considers what support households will need before, during, and after flooding. Response plans must consider strategies and mechanisms for supporting relocated IDPs when they are ready and able to return home, even if that requires coordination with other development actors or response platforms. All future climate shock response plans should start by identifying what success looks like, not just for the emergency response but the connection back to development activities and support for more sustainable handovers.

3. The Flood Task Force, RiPA North, and other disaster prevention stakeholders must address and improve data reliability issues. They must clearly define "households that relocated" as the accuracy of this classification is important to the collection and reporting of results and, more importantly, to understanding the efficacy or potential lessons learned of climate shock responses.

4. Climate shock response efforts must use a hyper-localized approach in the identification and design of interventions and implementation, to achieve community awareness and early action. This should include locale-specific early warning messages shared through established community systems and other local communication networks, as well as an improved understanding of the motivators, cultural implications, and alternative traditional solutions to broader relocation efforts. Longer-term trust-building between the GOE and communities, especially at a local level, will also improve disaster risk management and reduction. Flood prevention stakeholders should focus on future participatory scenario planning (PSP) advisories and EW messages on how relocation can preserve lives and property, to reflect households' interest in protecting their wellbeing. Additionally, more extensive messaging that includes clear relocation center information will help reach more at-risk households with clear and accessible information to help households make an informed decision about whether or not to relocate. The early warning information should be coupled with community awareness efforts; delivered frequently and in a timely way (e.g., at least two weeks in advance); and focused on the relocation of households.

5 Government of Ethiopia stakeholders should continue to fund and lead the flood prevention and recovery efforts, in coordination with development partners, specifically for the Afar Flood Task Force ahead of each kiremt season. By funding the Flood Task Force, the government promoted flood efforts as a shared burden. The government should continue and increase funding for prevention efforts to avoid more costly recovery efforts. Beyond acquiring additional funding for various response resources, a full-time ARFTF with multi-year funding should be considered to ensure sufficient funding and secure the technical and financial skills that are needed to effectively carry out many of the ARFTF's operations since the flood shock commonly occurs each year. The ARFTF and other climate shock efforts must actively engage meteorological data and experts throughout their planning and implementation processes. This should be appropriately budgeted for both financially and in workplanning to ensure timely flows of information that enable early action and adaptation as needed.

Introduction

Ethiopia has been facing a higher frequency and intensity of disasters due to long-term environmental degradation and shifting global weather patterns, which are further exacerbated by climate change. Within this context, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Ethiopia is carrying out the Resilience In Pastoral Areas (RiPA) North Program, implemented by MercyCorps, which builds community resilience in pastoral lowlands. The program component, "Improved Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Systems," engages with different task forces to support the Government of Ethiopia (GOE) in transforming these groups to become action-oriented, joint planning bodies.

One of the DRM task forces RiPA North has participated in since early 2020 is the Afar Regional Flood Task Force, which consists of government officials, community leaders, RiPA North staff, other development actors, and private sector entities. In 2021, the Flood Response Task Force took early action that included RiPA North facilitating joint DRM system-strengthening action planning; helping the government own task management, budget allocation, and implementation of DRM; strengthening early warning systems; and improving coordination and communication among DRM actors.[1] As a result of this enhanced Flood Task Force Response, early indications were that the flooding from the 2021 kiremt season was not nearly as devastating as the 2020 kiremt season.

In anticipation of the predicted severity of climate effects and shocks of the La Niña season (June to September 2022), USAID wanted to learn from the Afar Regional Flood Task Force's approach to the 2021 kiremt season given its perceived effectiveness.[2] The objectives of this evaluative effort were twofold: to help USAID better understand why this particular flood response was effective, how it was implemented, and what its challenges were to potentially replicate and share these lessons with others who are in a position to adapt and improve future climate shock response efforts; and to inform USAID's La Niña imminent intervention designs and budget decisions, help other regional Development Actors and implementing partners learn and leverage learnings to inform future flood roadmaps.

Evaluation Questions

The underpinning evaluation questions (EQs) for this effort come from USAID's desire to better understand how and why this particular climate shock response was effective and what the contributions were from USAID, implementing partners (IPs), GOE, private sector, and the community. In addition to the overarching Developmental Evaluation (DE) Learning Question(s) that led to this effort, the evaluation questions this study seeks to answer are as follows:

1. Why was the proactive Flood Task Force response carried out in the Afar Region ahead of the 2021 kiremt season effective compared to previous flood early action and responses in the region?
    a. What was the implementation process behind this flood response (from start to finish)?
    b. What were the outcomes (both intended and unintended) of the Flood Task Force response during this season?

[1] Mercy Corps FtF RiPA FY21 Q3 Report

[2] In January 2022, the details of this flood response were expanded in a *Case Study of the 2021 Afar Region Flood Response report* produced by Mercy Corps and CARE. The evaluation team reviewed this report, compared it against the draft Evaluation Questions, and determined (in consultation with USAID) that an evaluative effort was still needed.

2. What roles did the GOE, USAID's RiPA North (Mercy Corps/CARE), community leaders, private sector, and others each play in generating the effective response?

    a. What did coordination and collaboration look like between actors on the Flood Task Force and those interacting with the Task Force?

3. Why did some households choose to relocate while others did not?

    a. What were the motivating factors for households who chose to relocate early?

        i. What role did early warning (EW) information have in household decision-making?

        ii. What influence did the results of past flood seasons have on households' decision this most recent kiremt flood season?

    b. What was the experience of the communities who relocated because of the flood warnings compared to those who decided to stay put?

4. What financial factors and other contributions were important to the success of this flood response (e.g., budget cycle, timeliness of funds, contributions from the GOE et al, etc.)?

5. What lessons can be learned from this experience and shared with others for potential replication in other areas that are prone to flooding and in known climate shock preparation and response efforts?

Methods

Design & Scope

This evaluative effort used a Positive Deviance evaluative approach to better understand the outcome(s) of the recent Flood Task Force response in the Afar region. Positive Deviance (PD) looks at behavioral and social change and is based on the concept that "in any context, certain individuals confronting similar challenges, constraints, and resource deprivations to their peers, will nonetheless employ uncommon but successful behaviors or strategies which enable them to find better solutions."[3] Through an in-depth data collection and analysis effort, Positive Deviance enables more concrete understanding of how innovative solutions to development challenges interact with the implementing context, what capacities and other influencing variables are needed for successful and sustained application, and how these solutions may be successfully replicated in other contexts. This design was chosen because USAID had already selected the flood task response as a successful "bright spot" that it would like to better understand for learning and potential replication, and the Positive Deviance approach allows for substantiation of the process taken to achieve the outcome and improved understanding of the how, why, and contextual factors that led to the positive deviant, which achieves the purpose of this evaluative effort.

Data Collection

To learn more about this positive deviant and the machinations behind the perceived effectiveness, the evaluation team conducted a document review of secondary documents from USAID, IPs, and other stakeholders. The team also conducted 70 key informant interviews (KIIs) and hosted a validation workshop with USAID and MercyCorps. Interviews were conducted in-person for stakeholders based in the sampled Woredas (see Sampling Strategy section), and remotely for those not located in the sampled Woredas. The DE Team designed the number of interviews to support sampling saturation. The team used tailored data collection instruments for each homogenous group (see Additional Resources). The local data collection team consisted of two qualitative interviewers (who spoke Afari) and an evaluation team member who oversaw their work. The team transcribed and translated the data for analysis in the qualitative coding software, Dedoose.

Sampling Strategy

The sampling strategy for this effort followed best practice for Positive Deviance cases and employed purposive and snowball sampling methods. **Purposive sampling** was used because there was a limited number of specific actors who have detailed knowledge of the case, and the initial purposive sample was selected based on who is best informed to articulate the process of engagement, outcome, and current status of the bright spot case. From these initial points of contact, the evaluation team identified secondary interviewees using **snowball sampling** to substantiate the outcomes and provide additional nuance and differing perspectives. Saturation of the qualitative concepts being shared is designed to be reached by carrying out 6 interviews per homogeneous group, which supports the capture of 70% of core concepts. This number is based on a combination of the sampling saturation standard being between 6 and 12 interviews (Guest et al (2006)) to reach 70-92% of core concepts being shared, while also supporting an appropriate design for the rapid assessment. For this study, homogenous group was defined as a group that was mostly likely to have similar experiences with the response (e.g., households that relocated, households that did not relocate, government officials, etc.).

[3] https://www.betterevaluation.org/en/plan/approach/positive_deviance

As RiPA North targeted seven Woredas (Chifra, Mile Dubti, Afambo, Aysaita, Amibara, and Gewane), the evaluation team sampled from the four Woredas located closest to the river, where households were at greatest risk to the floods (Mili, Afambo, Dubtu, and Asayita). The team visited three of the four Woredas, based on which were the safest and easiest to travel to. As this evaluative effort was mostly focused on processes, gender disaggregation was not a central focus, but at the community level, there was a heightened gender component to ensure the evaluation design was gender-sensitive.

Table 1: Homogeneous Group Sample Frame for Afar Case Study

Homogeneous Groups	Target	Actual
Households that relocated	18	18
Households that did not relocate	18	18
RiPA North Activity Members*	6	6
Ethiopian Disaster Risk Management Commission (EDRMC) Official	1	0
Regional Government Officials*	6	6
Woreda Government Officials*	6	6
Community Leaders*	6	6
Private Sector Entities (Near Tendaho Canal)	6	3
Other Development Partners*	6	7
Total	**73**	**70**

**Involved with Planning and/or Payment Contributions toward Afar Flood Task Force Response.*

Limitations

As detailed in the inception report for this evaluative effort, there were several limitations and risks associated with the chosen method and the operating environment for this case study. To the extent possible, the evaluation team planned and adapted to mitigate these concerns. As shown in Table 1 above, the team was not able to interview one stakeholder from Ethiopian Disaster Risk Management Commission (EDRMC). The team sent multiple interview requests and follow-ups but did not receive a response. Related to the private sector stakeholders, during the data collection phase, the evaluation team learned that there were not as many stakeholders in this group involved in the response as anticipated. Despite these several stakeholders not being interviewed, the team was able to meet sampling saturation for this evaluative effort.

COVID-19 continued to be a risk, but the interviewers took precautionary measures when conducting KIIs during field level data collection including wearing surgical quality face masks and using hand sanitizer to prevent the spread of COVID-19.

Elaborated further in the findings of the case study, data reliability was a persistent issue in this evaluative effort. Some households that the Task Force had noted as having relocated actually did not relocate, or they did relocate and then went back home. Other households that were indicated as not having relocated, in fact did relocate or did so at the community level (not at a relocation center due to EW information). Lastly, some households noted as having relocated did not do so willingly, they were forcibly displaced, which was not the intention of this intervention.

Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Why was the proactive Flood Task Force response carried out in the Afar Region ahead of the 2021 kiremt season effective compared to previous flood early action and responses in the region? (EQ1)

This evaluative effort revealed evidence that during the 2021 flood response there were notable improvements compared to past responses including improved coordination, prevention, and evacuation. Specifically, the Task Force conducted wider and earlier early warning (EW) communications and prevention work and relocated a larger number of households than in years past, resulting in an overall reduction of immediate flood damage including the saving of lives and assets. According to stakeholders interviewed for this evaluative effort, the most pivotal parts of the Task Force's flood response process were the early warning information and community awareness efforts and the pre-flood maintenance on waterways.

The findings also highlighted several significant challenges that limited the positive impact of this intervention. Not all flood-affected households were adequately informed, either not receiving any EW communications or seeing flood-prevention efforts. Additionally, though the relocation efforts were initially successful, many relocation plans did not include a strategy for properly supporting internally displaced people (IDPs) with food and non-food items (NFIs) at relocation centers or returning to their homes, meaning that suffering was not entirely mitigated, just delayed.

Evaluation Question 1 (EQ1) Findings

Government Engagement and Political Will Findings

The evaluation showed that many factors enabled the successes of the Flood Task Force in 2021 as well as aspects that presented challenges and led to shortfalls. The first component of the Flood Task Force Operations is the GOE's engagement and commitment. The work of local sector offices, particularly the DRM team, contributed to positive outcomes before, during, and after the flooding (6 excerpts from 6 sources). The evidence revealed that sector offices and government bodies at different levels were actively engaged in flood mitigation work and contributed to wide information dissemination and community mobilization. The government was motivated to act on flood prevention and recovery due to a sense of responsibility and leadership (3 excerpts from 3 sources) and their interest in cost savings (10 excerpts from 10 sources). Respondents generally noted the government's desire to avoid the costs of flood damage, primarily because of the significant costs incurred from the previous year, 2020. As one development partner stated, *"If they work to prevent this, the damage will be reduced. So, the coordination and the leadership from the government side were mutual to the benefit of the community and also the government."*

Moreover, some of the governments' positive political will also stemmed from community-level motivation and buy-in, as it was not only important for accomplishing flood preparation work, but also encouraged higher-level government bodies to commit to the work (13 excerpts from 9 sources). One household respondent said, *"In my village, the community was organized and 25 people worked on flood prevention, including regularly mobilizing people to remove wood and help divert the flood situation. Community accepted the government and community leader's direction to relocate ahead of time; this close coordination and community acceptance motivated Woreda and regional authorities."*

On the other hand, the evidence also identified challenges related to government engagement in the 2021 flood efforts. 11 excerpts from 11 sources mentioned that the government was not committed to flood prevention efforts and did not substantially contribute to reducing the flood damage. Almost all of these sources, across all Woredas, stated that they did not see the government take any pre-flood action. One community leader suggested that the government's attention was divided between the regional conflict and COVID-19, so it did not pay attention to flood prevention efforts. One of the household respondents that did not relocate said, *"We were inundated with the flood and lost property because the government did not take pre-flood action."* Respondents noted that government attention and ownership only became focused on the Flood Task Force efforts after the flooding began (3 excerpts from 3 sources). There was also particularly low engagement of the regional sector bureaus, which resulted in the local DRM office/bureau picking up the necessary work (5 excerpts from 4 sources). A development partner said that not all government bureaus *"understand the degree of the flood's negative effect, it was observed that all participants did not share the burden of the efforts and saw a lack of commitment or did not buy-in the efforts equally. So, all government offices and partners did not buy-in equally."*

Stakeholder Engagement and Coordination Findings

The next key element of Flood Task Force operations in 2021 was the active engagement of the various stakeholders in the Flood Task Force efforts, which enabled Flood Task Force operations (7 excerpts from 6 sources). In particular, respondents noted that concerned stakeholders more actively participated and engaged with the flood prevention activities in 2021, highlighting the active participation of development partners and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the Flood Task Force meetings and pre-flood activities. The experiences of suffering through previous floods influenced the actions of stakeholders in the 2021 flood season (14 excerpts from 14 sources). In particular, the Flood Task Force and the government recognized their failure to prepare communities to act in 2020, so they adjusted their plans for pre-flood efforts in 2021. One development partner said, *"In 2021, most challenges were overcome because much learning was taken from the 2020 flood season's failure or weakness."* Applied learnings included opening Emergency Coordination Center (ECC) branches in local locations, stronger commitment to action, and better coordination from the stakeholders on the Task Force and with the communities (17 excerpts from 13 sources). One RiPA North informant said, *"Not new, but the commitment of the stakeholders is different, for example, responsibility sharing, and the [Task Force] approach [to pre-flood efforts]."*

However, evidence more strongly points to a continued lack of commitment and attention from stakeholders as inhibiting the operations of the Flood Task Force (19 excerpts from 14 sources). Respondents identified lackluster commitment from government stakeholders, community-level actors, the Task Force, and other donors. The sources indicated frustration that responsible persons did not accomplish their tasks and that the communities and households did not take warnings seriously or act to prevent flood damage. Similarly, 7 excerpts from 5 sources mentioned that negligence or lack of ownership among partners contributed to the inhibiting factors for the Flood Task Force efforts. The evidence also highlighted stakeholder coordination issues (18 excerpts from 13 sources). Respondents felt that the Flood Task Force and other official government bodies concerned with DRM did not sufficiently coordinate with each other or the local communities. One Woreda-level government respondent noted, *"The Task Force commitment had some gaps. So, it is good to have better initiation and commitment in the Task Force in the future response efforts. There should be integration between Woreda Management and Administration Office in the Task Force. So, this might contribute to reducing many challenges and negative factors."*

Planning Findings

Planning was an essential enabler to the Flood Task Force as it helped guide flood prevention efforts and actions at all levels in the region (12 excerpts from 6 sources). Specifically, the Flood Task Force supported the government in rapid action planning and facilitated a multi-sectoral

action plan to provide emergency flood assistance in Afar following the 2020 kiremt season flood by identifying the gaps, the priority of needs, resources on hand, and potential partners (4 excerpts from 4 sources). In particular, the availability of weather-specific information was helpful in planning implementation (10 excerpts from 6 sources). Weather forecasts and meteorological data were used to inform the Flood Task Force operations and scenario planning with an inclusive group of stakeholders to create sector-specific action plans while consulting with meteorological experts. The Participatory Scenario Planning workshop in June 2021 brought together varied stakeholders and allowed the Flood Task Force to form an inclusive and evidence-informed plan deemed pivotal by three excerpts from three sources.

On the other hand, 12 excerpts from 9 sources identify poor planning as inhibiting the Flood Task Force's operations. A secondary RiPA North document (Afar Region DRM Office_Community Based Early Warning) concluded that the 2021 Task Force planning did not sufficiently assess and differentiate the strategic requirements of stakeholders. Respondents criticized the shortsightedness of the Flood Task Force's plans, commenting that there was no strategy for relocating IDPs. There were also observations that contingency planning was weak. Finally, some respondents described that the Task Force's plans were not sufficiently informed by the local context and needs.

Distinctions from Past Years - Earlier Household Relocation Findings

The strongest distinction from past years was a significant increase in households that chose to relocate before the 2021 floods compared to past years (29 excerpts from 23 sources). Respondents noted that households relocated earlier, before the flooding, much more than in past years. The perceived motivating factor was that communities' difficult experiences during past floods encouraged people to pay more attention to the early warning messaging and preparedness guidance (5 excerpts from 5 sources). Because of increased early relocation, fewer houses were displaced by flooding (4 excerpts from 4 sources). Moreover, the 2021 increase in relocated households co-occurred in the data with improved access to and utilization of early warning information. Relatedly, 23 excerpts from 19 sources established that household and asset relocation was successful and reduced damage from the floods. One household respondent who did not relocate said, *"Yes, they informed us before the flood to relocate. Those who accept their message, they saved their livestock and crops, they send cars to relocate people"*. Respondents stated that development partners and the government provided better transportation for relocation and materials for pre-flood mitigation work.

On the other hand, a significant amount of data indicates respondents saw no distinction in the pre-flood efforts in 2021 from past years (22 excerpts from 20 sources). These respondents noted that the flood damage happens every year and that people relocated due to their understanding that floods occur yearly around the same time. Most household respondents specifically mentioned that they did not see anything new in 2021. For example, one household respondent who did not relocate stated, *"No, I did not see anything new. We are always displaced when flooding comes each year"* and one Woreda-level government respondent said, *"It is the usual trend from year to year, no special method."*

A More Localized Approach Findings

A more localized approach to the flood response, primarily through community leaders, also contributed to the Flood Task Force's improved effectiveness in the 2021 season (26 excerpts from 17 sources). This included translating messages to Afar, sensitivity to the culture of the Afar people, and utilizing folk media channels for information dissemination. Community Leaders and government officials at the Woreda and Kebele levels were also actively engaged in pre-flood preparation efforts, including disseminating information and leading preparedness activities. Many household respondents noted that they were more likely to believe or take flood preparation information seriously if it came from trusted community leaders. One Woreda-level

government respondent discussed how, "In Afar, if you transfer a message by community influential or clan leaders, the communities accept the message immediately without any hesitation than other intellectuals or government bodies do. The Task Force and government bodies were using this community leadership to transmit an early warning message."

Local community awareness was an important factor for the operations of the Flood Task Force (12 excerpts from 11 sources). The government and the Flood Task Force performed impactful awareness-raising activities that contributed to early relocations and preparedness in different communities. One community leader interviewed said, *"Now our people have improved their awareness on flood prevention. Before people were refusing to relocate and prevention now men and women now improved their understanding."* Community mobilization also contributed to positive flood mitigation outcomes (14 excerpts from 12 sources). With assistance from local leaders and government officials, as well as flood prevention information dissemination, local communities became more active in preparing for the flood and took early action. Three excerpts from 3 sources corroborated this behavior change in local communities in 2021 compared to past years--households were more reluctant to relocate early in past years, but in 2021 they took the warnings more seriously, and many households chose to relocate. A regional government source said, *"Yes, there is a difference because many peoples' attitude have changed. Many people have been relocated before flooding, therefore, flood damage was essentially minimized."*

On the other hand, 10 excerpts from 5 non-household sources identified cultural barriers as inhibiting the efforts of the Flood Task Force. The sources shared their perception that the Afar people are very religious and slow to accept new information, especially prevention and forecasting information. These sources also mentioned that many communities have been settled on their land for many generations and believed households were hesitant to move due to this attachment. Respondents also noted that some communities had difficulty understanding the early warning messages.

Prevention and Preparedness Findings

Encouragingly, 25 excerpts from 20 sources credit the Flood Task Force for successfully carrying out its responsibilities. Many sources identify the prevention of a degree of flood damage because of the Flood Task Force, observing that the Flood Task Force's work saved assets (most stakeholder groups) and lives (most stakeholder groups, fewer households). The Flood Task Force's pre-flood actions in 2021 were considered to be an improved strategy over the 2020 efforts (18 excerpts from 18 sources). This included aggressively disseminating early warning information, relocating households early, and taking proactive public works preparedness and prevention measures (18 excerpts from 11 sources). In terms of disseminating early warning information and relocating households early, the evidence identified that communications through various media outlets and community leaders helped to reduce the effects of the flooding (36 excerpts from 29 sources). To this end, the data noted that the quantity of EW communications and dissemination methods greatly increased in 2021 compared to previous flood seasons (32 excerpts from 18 sources). The respondents highlighted how using various methods of communication, including direct and traditional methods, and engaging community leaders in the dissemination efforts helped reach more households and convince more people to leave ahead of the floods. One household respondent who did not relocate said, *"They sent messages on the radio, TV and in Woreda and Kebele level they coordinated with each other. This is specific to me compared to previous years."* Concerning public works measures, 21 excerpts from 15 sources noted that there were more and improved flood prevention efforts ahead of the 2021 flood season. These works included building and maintaining dikes, cut-offs, canals, terraces, and other irrigation as well as manipulating water flows with dams. One Private Sector informant said, *"Making dykes have not been new but the maintenance mechanism has become new. Most ditches were earthen-based so, they required yearly maintenance. Another thing that could be new was making a diversion. Different diversions or cut-offs were prepared to reduce the rate of the flooding flow by making it to flow in different directions."*

However, the evidence also demonstrated a contradictory pre-flood experience for many informants. To begin with, 44 excerpts from 27 sources (20 households across all Woredas, 5 Community Leaders, one GOE, and one private sector entity (PSE)) stated that they did not see any action from authorities to prevent or mitigate the flood damage. Similarly, many respondents stated that they were unaware of any pre-flood preparation information (19 excerpts from 10 sources [8 households, across all Woredas, and 2 Community Leaders]). These household respondents explained that they did not receive any information about the flooding, and if they chose to evacuate, it was only because their neighbors were doing the same or from their own previous experience. Evidence also contradicted the effectiveness of early warning information (14 excerpts from 7 sources). For example, households received early warning information, but specific details on where to relocate were unclear, the distance to the relocation site was too far, or there was low community awareness of early warning information. [See EQ3 findings for more information about the role early warning information had in households' decision-making.]

Finally, 12 excerpts from 10 sources mentioned that the work done by the Flood Task Force did not reduce the damage from the flooding. Others highlighted that much of the Flood Task Force's work was done reactively after the flooding had started, which was counter to the Flood Task Force's goals (13 excerpts from 10 sources). These interviewees thought the work was mainly about recovery from flooding rather than early prevention. There were concerns that by not acting earlier, there was an avoidably high level of damage and higher associated recovery costs. One household respondent who did not relocate said, "*The government was reactive and was busy with minimizing the loss of human life and livestock when the flood overflowed on the communities. Other than this, no one communicated with us regarding flood prevention.*"

Flood Severity Finding

According to five excerpts from five sources, a further enabler for the Flood Task Force was that the floods in 2021 were weaker than those in 2020. Some respondents believed this led to more minor flooding and less damage.

DRM Capacities Findings

Providing training and capacity building on DRM to Flood Task Force members was important to the success of the flood response and supported the Flood Task Force's operations (15 excerpts from 7 sources). Respondents noted the importance of building the capacity of the Flood Task Force itself, the capacity of local communities to respond to early warnings, and the DRM capacities of local governments and flood-prevention workers. Their abilities were improved to conduct assessments, identify problems related to disasters, collect data and analyze for the issues related to locally important information on climate risks, vulnerabilities, and adaptive capacities, as well as access and use early warning information (8 excerpts from 3 sources). A total of three sources identified a significant co-occurrence between capacity building and stakeholder coordination. However, the Flood Task Force's DRM preparedness, response, and technical skills still required additional strengthening and inhibited their efforts in the Afar Region in 2021 (10 excerpts from 4 sources). Specifically, a lack of experience disseminating early warning information, inadequate training for community-level actors, a competency gap in the flood risk management committees, and a lack of technically-skilled actors to lead flood prevention and evacuation efforts limited the efficacy of the response.

Enabling & Inhibiting Environment Factors Findings

One condition that enabled the Flood Task Force process was utilizing local leaders (26 excerpts from 17 sources (most stakeholder groups, plus secondary RiPA North documents). Community leaders were key points for disseminating flood information in their communities. Many household respondents noted that they were more likely to believe or take flood preparation information seriously if it came from trusted community leaders.

The data identified stakeholder coordination as another critical enabler for the Flood Task Force processes, especially pre-flood operations (25 excerpts from 13 sources). The Task Force and the ECC provided central platforms for effective coordination between stakeholders. One RiPA North respondent said, *"having that platform... the ECC (Emergency Coordination Office) center and Task Force team meeting is a good platform to plan with all the stakeholders, to come together and get prepared ahead of time in terms of preparing a response plan if the flood happens."*

Other local disasters impeded the Flood Task Force (5 excerpts from 4 sources). Sources highlight that regional conflicts led to travel restrictions, disruptions in services, and reduced public trust in government messaging. The COVID-19 pandemic and related restrictions drew resources away from other efforts and limited the ability of stakeholders to travel and meet (3 excerpts from 3 sources).

EQ1 Conclusions

While positive and improved from previous years, government engagement in and commitment to carrying out the Afar Regional Flood Task Force's (ARFTF) efforts also lacks consistent attention, focus, and buy-in from various government sector offices and levels. However, the GOE understands the cost-effective advantage to flood prevention versus the incurring tremendous costs associated with flood damage. This motivates their political will to invest in and carry out DRM efforts, indicating that the inconsistency in buy-in may be predominately a capacity and coordination issue.

Additionally, there appears to be a reciprocal relationship between government authorities' political will and communities' commitment to contribute to flood prevention efforts. Government authorities are motivated by community commitment to act, and communities are willing to contribute to flood prevention efforts when they see action from the government.

Evidence was split as to stakeholders' commitment, engagement, and coordination in and with the ARFTF in 2021. While other findings related to the number of people who relocated and improvements in dissemination of early warning information corroborate that stakeholders were more engaged and committed to ARFTF efforts than years past, there is sufficient data to suggest that significant improvements can still be made in terms of the consistency of engagement and proactive coordination between ARFTF stakeholders in flood responses. It is worth noting that increased commitment from Task Force stakeholders partly stemmed from their experience with the devastation of the flooding the previous year, so alternative motivating factors such as demonstration of cost-effectiveness may be necessary to continue to build commitment for future years' efforts.

Stronger planning supported more proactive and high-quality implementation of ARFTF operations in 2021 (e.g., flood response plans at all levels, clear roles and responsibilities, rapid action planning, participatory scenario planning (PSP) workshop, sector-specific action plans, use of relevant meteorological data for EW information, etc.). However, planning was insufficient in terms of considering a) the fullness of the response needed, b) a hyper-localized response that met the variations of shock experienced across Afar, and c) a comprehensive strategy for returning relocated IDPs after the end of the flood incidence, which delayed rather than prevented suffering in many instances.

Improved household relocation numbers were due to numerous factors, including negative experiences in past floods, timely and contextualized early warning information, and behavior change. Changing household behavior to more seriously consider early warning information and follow official advice resulted from the localized approach used by community leaders and local government officials and increased the number of households who decided to relocate ahead of the flood. Increased numbers of households moving away from the flooding ahead of time may have reduced the damage, but it also required more resources to support a larger relocated population. And there were still implementation gaps in the Flood Task Force's community

awareness efforts, as not all communities were reached, with awareness varying even within the households identified by the IP for this case study sample. Additionally, some communities still independently took prevention actions, and some households chose to relocate, but this was due to past experiences rather than efforts from the Flood Task Force. Communities did not express any apprehension to move due to their religious beliefs, long-term settlement on their land, or unwillingness to accept new information. This difference highlights a disconnect in the understanding between some stakeholders' perception of households' rationale for not relocating and households' actual reasons for not relocating.

One of the most impressive aspects of the 2021 Flood Task Force's planning and implementation efforts compared to past years was its proactive development and dissemination of early warning information using various communication methods and more localized communication channels. However, while deemed effective by many (including households that relocated), this EW information did not have quite the expansive reach nor consistent effect that it was thought to have had, as evidenced by insufficient and an absence of early warning information experienced by many, as well as an inconsistent link between receipt of early warning information and the decision to relocate. The latter point is notable given the significant increase in the number of households relocated before the 2021 floods in Afar, compared to past years, but as the data is inconclusive in drawing a distinct connection between the two, the extent to which early warning information from the Flood Task Force played a part in the relocation of this large group is unclear. Additionally, the new canal maintenance mechanisms and diversions/cut-offs in 2021 were carried out well and reduced damage. However, the effectiveness of these efforts is inconclusive since many shared that the river's strength was beyond the capacity of the infrastructure efforts intended to curtail the flood.

While there are still some notable skills gaps within the ARFTF, the capacity-building efforts from development partners have shown promising improvements in the ARFTF's technical skills, better equipping them to carry out their work more effectively.

EQ1 Recommendations

1. The EDRMC must enforce accountability of government performance at every level of emergency response operations to ensure consistent buy-in and performance in carrying out climate shock responses. This may require additional capacity building and coordination, which can be supported by USAID Activities such as The Disaster Risk Management Capacity Building Activity/Building a Resilient Ethiopia (DRM-CB/BRE), National Incident Management System (NIMS), and the Professionalization and Youth Leadership Activity (PYL), and through multi-stakeholder engagement and mutual accountability through coordination platforms like the Afar Flood Task Force.

2. The Flood Task Force should further build upon the higher levels of engagement and commitment seen during the 2021 ARFTF stakeholders in future years, as well as avoid any potential complacency that could set in after a high level of engagement. GOE engagement should reinforce this (both internally and with other donors/partners) by accounting for any known areas of stakeholder disengagement or coordination failures based on the 2021 response lessons learned.

3. For climate shock task force responses more broadly, high levels of engagement and commitment from stakeholders through a mutually agreed upon terms of reference and established modes and frequency of communication should be a prerequisite to carrying out a task force response. Without this, task force operations are subject to not being completed as intended, and may even lead to harm as a result of incomplete or gaps in services.

4 The Flood Task Force must build upon its approach to planning efforts to take an increasingly hyper-localized approach and ensure response design holistically considers HH support needed before, during, and after flooding. Response plans must consider strategies and mechanisms for supporting relocated IDPs when they are ready to return home, even if that requires coordination with other development actors and/or response platforms. All future climate shock response plans should start with the end in mind by identifying what success looks like, not just for the emergency response but the responses' connection back to development activities and support for more sustainable handovers.

5 Climate shock response efforts must also employ a hyper-localized approach in the identification and design of approaches as well as implementation channels to achieve community awareness and early action. This should include locale-specific early warning messages shared through trusted community leaders and other local communication networks and an improved understanding of motivators, cultural implications, and alternative local solutions to broader relocation efforts. Longer-term trust-building between the GOE and communities, especially at a local level, will also improve disaster risk management and reduction.

6 The Flood Task Force and DRM programming more broadly must continue to incorporate training for all involved stakeholders as part of the planning and pre-flood phases of their work. The Flood Task Force must also commit sufficient resources to hiring and retaining skilled staff. The same recommendation stands for any future climate shock response efforts.

What was the implementation process behind this flood response – from start to finish? (EQ1a)

Early warning information and community awareness efforts were unequivocally identified as the most pivotal parts of the pre-flood action (22 excerpts from 22 sources). Others believed that the efforts to maintain the water canal were the most pivotal (10 excerpts from 9 sources). And, the cumulative efforts across multiple stakeholders and sharing of operational tasks was noted as a pivotal pre-flood action (6 excerpts from 6 sources).

ICON KEY

- Pivotal Step
- Ongoing Part of this Step
- Exact Timing is Unclear
- Concurrent

Phase 1: Inception

Step 1: Establish the Afar Regional Flood Task Force (ARFTF)

Bi-weekly DRM task force meetings in Afar focus on flood task force activation, the kiremt rain forecast, food incidence, and the recurrent conflict between Afar and Issa clans.

Step 2: Reactivate ARFTF

The Flood Task Force is reactivated to avoid flood damage ahead of the 2021 kiremt season flood. It involves bringing together government, Private Sector Entities, and other partners to coordinate flood prevention activities from the regional, zonal, woreda, and kebele levels, as well as trigger anticipatory actions in flood-prone woredas ahead of the flood. All parties are involved in the response's planning and implementation, and their roles are outlined in the terms of reference (TOR) document.

Phase 2: Planning for Flood Prevention

Step 3: Conduct Assessments

The Flood Task Force conducts a series of assessments to inform its plans and operations and map resources from the ARFTF stakeholders to determine who has what to contribute to the flood response. Assessments include:

- **Learnings from 2020:** Development partners list out their learnings from the 2020 flood to inform how they will be addressed in 2021 ahead of the next flood.
- **Conduct a Pre-flood Assessment:** The Flood Task Force conducts a preliminary assessment to identify flood-prone areas, places where the flood broke out before, understand past damage and displacement due to the flood, etc. to inform prevention mechanisms for future flooding. Development partners map vulnerable areas to determine which should be addressed first. Additionally, The Basin Authority and Afar Water Works, and Regional Disaster Prevention and Food Security Bureaus identify which areas of the river's canal need maintenance, new river flow, or widening, as well as which actions require prioritization and immediate action. The results of this assessment help inform the work of private sectors, communities, and others.
- **Conduct a Community-Level Risk Assessment:** A field-level risk assessment is conducted to evaluate and prioritize risks for further analysis and response planning. This involves the Flood Task Force or a team collecting information from community leaders and elders from the community to inform a mitigation plan, community mobilization, and awareness creation.
- **Climate Vulnerability and Capacity Analysis (CVCA) Assessment:** A multi-disciplinary team of government experts from different sector offices conducts the CVCA assessment to collect and analyze locally relevant information on climate-related risks, vulnerabilities, and adaptive capacities. The information is used to develop a community-owned local adaptation action plan.

Regular Meetings

The Flood Task Force meetings occur weekly with all stakeholder groups. The Disaster Risk Management Bureau Head leads the meetings, including planning conversations between Flood Task Force stakeholders, sharing updated information techniques, etc. Critical issues or discussion points are captured and disseminated via meeting minutes to each stakeholder. In time, flood advisory messages are also provided in these regular meetings.

Step 4: The FTF Engages in Technical Trainings/Workshops/Support from Partners

The Flood Task Force participates in various trainings and workshops from partners to help strengthen their approach to carrying out effective flood prevention activities and ensure a high level of engagement from all relevant parties. Trainings and workshops include:

- **DRM Prioritization Workshop:** The Flood Task Force and RiPA identify gaps across sector offices to inform action plans. RiPA prioritizes the identified DRM gaps/themes at a workshop conducted in Afar at the regional level, validating the findings of the DRM institutional capacity assessment. Regional government experts participate, and DRM draft action plans are developed with RiPA's support.RiPA facilitates joint DRM system strengthening action planning to help the DRM sectoral offices prepare inclusive plans that ensure prevention, response, and post-recovery capabilities to all shocks, including floods. This empowers government actors to lead risk management action planning and processes at each administrative level and take ownership of overall task management, budget allocation, and implementation of DRM actions.

- **3C's Concept Training:** CARE Ethiopia provides training that introduces the 3C's (communication, collaboration, and coordination) concept to help the Flood Task Force team be on the same page and effectively manage the flood.

- **Participatory Scenario Planning (PSP) Workshop**: RiPA facilitates a PSP workshop for 24 Afar Regional Regional Disaster Prevention and Food Security Program Coordination Office (DPFSPCO) participants on the Karma 2021 rainy season's climate forecasting, identifying risks, and developing response plans together with regional meteorologists to strengthen early warning systems in seven woredas. Participants include the concerned six sector bureaus from the regional level, UN agencies, and other organizations, such as the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ). This workshop directly informs the PSP advisories that are prepared.

Coordination and Communication Support

RiPA improves coordination and communication among DRM actors (e.g., supporting the Flood Task Force) by following up on agendas and implementing action plans, etc. This includes the RiPA DRM team's participation in the DRM task force meetings held regularly at national and regional levels. NGOs provide technical support for mitigation measures, creating hazard maps, training modules, simulations of emergency response, etc.

Step 5: Establish the Flood Risk Preparedness Plan

The regional DPFSPCO in Afar Region develops the 2021 Flood Risk Mitigation and Preparedness Plan. This includes the roles and responsibilities of the ARFTF members to carry out the Task Force's efforts, as well as the engagement of the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), DRM, and EW experts with specific tasks. The Flood Risk Preparedness Plan is first shared with Sector offices for feedback, then with the Woreda and Zone Flood Task Forces and Kebeles at the Community Level. Community-owned local adaptation action plans are developed using results from the CVCA assessment, which collects and analyzes locally relevant information on climate-related risks, vulnerabilities, and adaptive capacities. Lastly, an Inclusive Information Dissemination and Communication Plan is developed and shared to communicate flood risks to communities, stakeholders, and partners.

Step 6: Initiate Flood Emergency Response Plan

A circular letter is written to the respective stakeholder and each stakeholder begins their commitment to what they will deliver for flood prevention and response to the flood situation (e.g., human capital, logistics, etc.). A sub-team from the regional Disaster Prevention and Preparedness (DPP) Office early warning team closely monitors this commitment and facilitates these response-related activities. The ARFTF shares a revised flood risk communication plan and a 3W (who does what, where) matrix as an input for the Flood Emergency Response Plan. After early warning messages are shared with the community, follow-up meetings are conducted with GOE Woreda officials to see if the plan was implemented correctly or if there are any gaps.

Sub-Step 6A: Mobilize Financial and Non-financial Resources

The Flood Task Force Prepares the Budget Plan in cooperation with all partners, and financial resources are mobilized from stakeholders according to the plan. Resources like shelter, food, and non-food items for households that decide to relocate are mobilized from all the stakeholders, and the Flood Task Force coordinates the resources (plastic shades, food items, cooking pans) collected from the NGOs.

[4] It is unclear if the Flood Risk Preparedness Plan is the same as a Mitigation Plan or the Flood Emergency Response Plan. Headlight did not receive a copy of either document to inform its findings.

Phase 3: Implementation of Flood Prevention

Step 7: The ARFTF Provides Trainings/Workshops and Technical Support

The Flood Task Force provides training to those Flood Task Force sub-teams ahead of their work in flood prevention activities. Examples include: the Afar Regional DPFSPCO involves community-level Flood Task Force teams in trainings ahead of their work in flood prevention activities; the ARFTF orients GOE Woreda Officials to the CVCA results to prepare for priority household relocation; the RiPA DRM team briefs the Woreda Flood Task Forces on the updated climate forecast to inform relocation sites in case of flooding; and RiPA uses the 3C's approach (communication, coordination and collaboration) at the Kebele level to increase the capacity of the community for improved information flow and coordination.

Step 8: Preparing EW Info and Messages

The Flood Task Force monitors weather forecasts during the Karma rainy season. Using the PSP approach from the workshop, GOE Woreda participants, other sectors, and regional meteorologists identify risks and flood hazards for each woreda and prepare PSP advisories to address the identified hazards for each woreda, based on livelihood types and probable scenarios. The messages inform communities about actions to reduce their exposure to the flood and vulnerability to its impacts. At the regional level, disaster information packages are produced in various media accessible to local people including the translation and recording of advisory messages in Afar language. They are then circulated from the Regional DRM Office to the respective Woreda DRM Offices.

Step 8: Water Canal Work/Infrastructure

The ARFTF coordinates with the Water Management Agency (also called the Awash, Lower Awash, or Upper Awash River Basins), the Water Bureau, and other Regional concerned bodies to prevent divergence of the river before the flood happens. Following the pre-flood assessment that identifies river infrastructure issues, the GOE's Basin Authority develops long- and short-term solutions for the construction and maintenance of flood protection structures.

Ongoing Coordination and Support of EW Info

Meetings between the ECC, Regional Disaster Mitigation (RDM) Office, and development partners are held to provide information about the water status and forecast, and share how the flood is expected to happen. At the Woreda level, the Woreda GOE Officials and the Flood Task Force follow and forecast the flood, preparing weekly reports about the early warning situation. The RiPA team works closely with government actors to create an enabling environment that supports the preparation and dissemination of response advisories, where all actors have clarity on their roles, function, and required actions related to early warning information for the community level to enable action.

Step 9: Selecting and Preparing Sites for Relocation

The Flood Task Force selects the sites for relocation, especially for the most vulnerable families. The DRM bureau prepares relocation sites and shelters before households move. In addition to the site selection steps, the community discusses the relocation decision, the date, and the preferred relocation place.

Step 10: Evacuating/Helping households Relocate Before the Flood

The Flood Task Force conducts awareness-raising activities, educating and mobilizing the community to relocate to safer areas in anticipation of flooding during the rainy season.

Community Leaders are essential to this effort, informing the community about relocation, letting them know the relocation place, etc. Woreda officials go to the at-risk areas as a campaign to relocate those households giving priority to women, pregnant women, children, and the elderly who live in the vulnerable area.

Step 11: Delivering Early Warning Messages, Community Awareness, and Relocation Communications

Based on the early warning reports from the Woredas, the Task Force deploys a regional expert team to implement community-based early warning, leading preparedness and prevention activities with the community, and directly supporting community mobilization and relocation in flood prone areas. The Pastoral and Agriculture Office at each Woreda (responsible for early warning) communicates the early warning messages to the Kebele and community levels using the early warning committees and other government structures. Flood early warning messages are disseminated in Afar language to those youth, elders, clan leaders, and community members who are at-risk by credible sources (e.g., government bodies, spiritual leaders, and respected community members) so households can save their livestock and crops. Two representatives from the community and a traditional forecaster support the process. In Community Leaders' conversations with community members, there is a focus on attitude change and awareness.

Early warning information is delivered in a timely way, beginning 3-4 months before the flood. This includes monthly communications to communities via mass media about the flood and precautions they should take. Information is disseminated in places where the community gathers; weekly communications at mosques, markets, and school clubs, as well as via TV, radio, and recorded audio communications; and social media posts.

Step 12: Support at the Relocation Site

At the relocation site, Community Leaders register households that decide to relocate. Community Leaders distribute food and non-food items to the relocated people. Government-provided resources include food, a temporary plastic sheet, and a mobile health facility. The mobile health team gives households water treatment, and chemical and sanitation material. Community Leaders bring any issues to the attention of the government for their action.

Phase 4: Flood Relief

Step 13: Evacuating People and Providing Support during the Flood Damage

The Flood Task Force (including those at the Woreda level) and federal representatives send a helicopter and boats to evacuate flood-affected households. The government supports flood-affected people during the flood with food and non-food items.

Step 14: Providing Support Post-Flooding

The ARFTF helps displaced people after the flood happens, by providing food, nutrition, medical support, medication, mosquito nets, health education, child protection services, psychosocial support, etc. Other development partners (that are part of the Flood Task Force) also perform risk reduction factor (RRF) and risk reduction measure (RRM) tasks. GOE Woreda Officials attend meetings where they collect data from development partners, share updates on daily activities, and discuss if there are shortages of any items.

What were the outcomes, intended and unintended, of the Flood Task Force response during this season? (EQ1b)

EQ1b Outcomes

Community Awareness and Preparedness

A positive outcome from the work of the Flood Task Force was heightened community awareness and preparedness for dealing with the 2021 flood season (19 excerpts from 17 sources). Early warning information helped households decide to relocate, and flood prevention guidance helped communities mitigate damage. Improved local capacity related to flood understanding and prevention was also a positive outcome of the Flood Task Force's work, according to 10 excerpts from 10 sources. This improved capacity comes from understanding flood warning information, behavior change towards flood precautions, and enhanced coordination of stakeholders on flood prevention and mitigation operations. One household respondent noted, *"The positive effect that occurred by [the Flood Task Force] was the attitude change of people towards the pre-relocation; the tendency of the entire community has changed completely."*

Relocation and Support to Households

Another positive outcome of the work of the Flood Task Force's operations identified by the sources was the successful relocation of households (24 excerpts from 20 sources). Early and well-prepared relocation was identified as key to saving lives and livelihoods. Respondents generally mentioned that a large number of households relocated. As one Community Leader said, *"I say the positive effect was relocation of numerous peoples before the flood disaster happen, this engagement saved many people's lives and the loss of many assets."* Furthermore, six excerpts from six sources highlight household sustenance through in-kind contributions, especially food, as an impactful and positive effect of the Flood Task Force. Many of these respondents felt that food support was the most visible or only operation they witnessed by the Flood Task Force.

Reduced Damage and Death

The sources indicated that a positive outcome of the Flood Task Force's work was the reduction of damage, including reducing lives lost and material destruction (24 excerpts from 21 sources). Respondents mentioned that while the floods still caused damage and harm, with the Flood Task Force's activities, the damage was less than it could have been. Half of these excerpts from various stakeholders explicitly credited the Flood Task Force's work as life-saving, and the others generally mentioned reduced damage during the flooding. One Development Partner highlighted the impact of the Flood Task Force, saying *"To reduce flood damage, a great job has been done. During heavy flood times, the team was able to prepare boats and sometimes helicopters to save flood-affected households. All Ethiopian instructions and organizations participated to save the Afar people at a time of heavy floods occurrence in the region. Hence, I believe these good achievements have been brought due to the Flood Task Force's great efforts."*

Negative, Unintended Outcomes

The evidence identified numerous unintended negative outcomes, either directly linked to the operations of the Flood Task Force or due to the limitations of the Flood Task Force's reach. The respondents noted conflicts between communities and the Flood Task Force, a lack of resources to provide the necessary support, and a lack of preparation ahead of time. One Community Leader mentioned, *"The negative impact was weakness from the government side because they did not*

perform what they can or what was expected from them. For instance, before the relocation of many households, the government should have prepared the necessary conditions, but they did not do anything, and because of that, the relocated people are suffering." Respondents highlighted severe challenges faced by the people who did relocate (10 excerpts from 8 sources). Though respondents report being supported in the relocation process, due to lack of preparation and resources, many people who relocated reported suffering once they were at the relocation centers. This includes a lack of food and starvation (4 excerpts from 4 sources), lack of water and medicine that have resulted in increased cases of disease (4 excerpts from 4 sources), and a lack of opportunity to resume farming activities to support themselves (6 excerpts from 4 sources). One household respondent outlined the issues, *"I understand it in two ways; first the government should not relocate us to an arid area, thus, unplanned relocation put us under difficult circumstances; and the other one is an unintentional consequence, which is lack of humanitarian aid."*

EQ1b Conclusion

The Flood Task Force's efforts to relocate households ahead of the flood, while largely successful on the front end (e.g., reducing displacement, saving lives and livelihoods, offering sustenance through in-kind contributions), likely because of their community awareness efforts, led many people to suffer once they were at the relocation sites, due to lack of preparedness and resources (e.g., a lack of food and starvation, lack of water and medicine). This reflects poor planning--shortsightedness of ARFTF plans, a lack of resources, and no strategy for relocating IDPs.

What roles did the GOE, USAID's RiPA North, community leaders, private sector, and others each play in generating the effective response? (EQ2)

Figure 1 depicts the roles that each stakeholder played in the 2021 Afar Flood Response.

Figure 1 Abbreviations

Afar Regional Flood Task Force (General)	TF
Government (General, not specified)	G
Government Federal	GF
Government Regional	GR
Government Woreda	GW
Government Kebele	GK
Community Leaders	C
Households	H
RiPA	R
Other (e.g., task force actors/partners and sectors, clusters, etc.)	O
Private sector	P

Figure 1 Icon Key

Task	TF	G	GF	GR	GW	GK	C	H	R	O	P
ECC Formation	R										
Leadership/Direction of ARFTF Efforts				R			R				
Coordination	R			R			R		R	R	
Planning the FTF Effort				R			R				
Conducting Assessments	A	A R		C					C	R	C
Preparing Plans	R	R		A R	C				R	R	
Resource Mobilization	R			R						R	
Budget	R	R									
Budget Development	R			R	C					C	
Budget Management				R						R	
Budget Funding		R						R	R	R	
Implementation of Pre-Flood Activities				R	R	R	R		R	R	
Canal Repair/Infrastructure Improvements				A	A		R			R	R
Early Warning Information (generation/distribution)	R	A		R	R	R	R		R	R	
Early Warning Committees				A	R	R					
Raising Community Awareness for 2021 Flood	R	A			R	R	R	C	R		
Training and Capacity for Community Preparedness							R		R	R	
Protecting, Relocating, and Resettling HHs Pre-Flood	R	A R					R		R	R	
Support to Flood-Affected Households During Flood	R		R	R			R		R	R	
Post-Flood Response							R		R	R	

What did coordination and collaboration look like between actors on the Flood Task Force and those interacting with the Task Force? (EQ2a)

EQ2 Findings

The evidence identified the ECC as a critical hub for coordinating stakeholders working on Afar flood issues (16 excerpts from 8 sources). The sources noted the large number of partners, offices, and stakeholders that were brought together at the ECC meetings and highlighted the coordination capabilities of the ECCs at each level of government. From the beginning of the operations, four excerpts from four sources noted the decision to establish a regional ECC was made in collaboration with the regional government, National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC), and federal sectoral offices in response to the flooding in September 2020. They established the regional ECC to provide effective coordination and respond to the complex emergencies in the region, including flooding. Additionally, four excerpts from three sources specifically mentioned the active work and coordination success of the ECC. One regional government respondent said, *"When the region was affected with COVID, drought, conflict and then flood, the ECC was established to cope with the various catastrophe the region was facing. Then the ECC was reactivated to work. It was working actively from year to year and functioning very well."*

Most respondents identified the Government of Ethiopia as the primary stakeholder leading coordination (42 excerpts from 22 sources). Government officials were involved in the pre-flood prevention and early warning actions, as well as the post-flood recovery work, at all levels of government, from Federal to Kebele. The government was primarily responsible for leading the Flood Task Force efforts, and government officials were the primary leaders of stakeholder coordination. Likewise, 10 excerpts from 8 sources indicated that the Flood Task Force operations depended on government coordination and contributions. The government body most highlighted is the DRM office.

Moreover, six excerpts from six sources specifically identified Woreda-level officials as key for coordinating with local communities. Respondents also highlighted working with the sector offices and sector-based coordination as part of the Flood Task Force (9 excerpts from 8 sources). The Flood Task Force was a successful platform for coordinating the different sectoral needs during the flooding. As one Woreda GOE respondent put it, *"When the disaster happens in the Woreda, different types of problem exist or are created such as reduction of agricultural production due to displacement of the people, shortage of food, the occurrence of disease outbreak, school dropout, etc...Therefore, having such kind of all sector-based engagement and coordination was a big success for the Task Force."*

Another key group in Flood Task Force coordination was Development Partners (31 excerpts from 18 sources). Partners (IPs, NGOs, and others) cooperated in providing the Flood Task Force with resources, technical support, and implementation support (10 excerpts from 9 sources). One Development Partner described the motivation of many partners: *"The government could do nothing alone for the prevention. So, it made a call to partners to prevent the flood as there was a risk of occurrence of the flood and this became a reason why partners came together."* Specific partners mentioned by a GOE informant were Dan Church Aid, Save the Children, CARE, and United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). Additionally, six excerpts from three sources discussed technical support from development partners as an impactful aspect of stakeholder coordination.

Additional stakeholders coordinating with the Flood Task Force were local committees and "clusters." According to six excerpts from five sources, establishing and coordinating with local committees was an impactful and successful aspect of stakeholder coordination. These committees mainly worked to disseminate early warning information at the Woreda and/or

Kebele level. These committees also helped to coordinate flood risk prevention on the ground in communities. Similarly, eight excerpts from six sources describe the "cluster" organization body as an integral part of stakeholder coordination. Clusters were mainly set up by sector or location and were directly responsible for implementing some of the Flood Task Force operations. Government officials led clusters with support from development partners.

The evidence further identifies the active participation of Community Leaders in flood prevention and recovery effort in 2021 (12 excerpts from 12 sources). Respondents noted that community leaders engaged with the Task Force and took a central role in the flood efforts at the community level. One household respondent said, *"The community leadership committed many activities in the community and they were primary stakeholders of the engagement."*

Additionally, three excerpts from three sources identified universities and university students as impactful development partners. Afar University participated in the Task Force efforts, and university students contributed to prevention efforts in their home communities. The RiPA project is also exploring a research partnership for DRM topics with Samara and Jigjiga Universities.

Successful Coordination Approaches

The data highlighted that coordination between stakeholders working on pre-flood prevention efforts was improved in 2021 from past years (17 excerpts from 13 sources). This included coordinating implementations between partners on the Flood Task Force and coordinating actions within the local communities. This included opening ECC branches in local locations, learning from past efforts, better coordination, and invigorated commitment from the stakeholders on the Task Force. One RiPA North informant said, *"Not new but the commitment of the stakeholders is different, for example, responsibility sharing, and the [Task Force] approach [to pre-flood efforts]."* The evidence clearly articulated that the Task Force itself was a success of stakeholder coordination (24 excerpts from 16 sources). The Flood Task Force coordinated the overall Afar flood effort, including pre-positioning resources, organizing regular meetings to provide support at the regional level, and strengthening the early warning platforms (8 excerpts from 5 sources). Moreover, seven excerpts from four sources noted the success of the Flood Task Force in de-duplicating resources spent and activities implemented through deliberate coordination of the stakeholders. Additionally, five excerpts from four sources highlighted the importance of clear roles for the efforts of the Flood Task Force. One development partner said, *"the positive effect was strengthening the coordination with partners, government agencies and bureaus, and other concerned bodies. This was a positive effect and existed for many months in the Task Force meetings of 2021."* The successful coordination supported by the Flood Task Force is a trend in the data that significantly co-occurs with the intended positive outcomes identified.

Active stakeholder engagement in the Flood Task Force efforts enabled successful coordination (12 excerpts from 10 sources), including actively participating in ECC meetings and sharing individual action plans and actions taken (4 excerpts from 4 sources). Additionally, the inclusiveness of all stakeholders working on implementing the Flood Task Force operations was essential to the success of the flood response (5 excerpts from 3 sources). This included more expansive stakeholder participation in pre-flood planning and dissemination of information.

The evidence identified that systems strengthening was a successful RiPA North programming principle, especially for the coordination work of the Afar Flood Task Force (10 excerpts from 6 sources). Working in a systems-oriented manner, down to the community level, allowed stakeholders to improve their DRM response capabilities. Systems strengthening was most evident in the increased capacity of stakeholders, which was an enabler for the Flood Task Force (15 excerpts from 7 sources). Respondents noted the importance of building the capacity of the Task Force itself, the capacity of local communities to respond to early warnings, and the DRM capacities of local government and flood-prevention workers.

Similarly, five excerpts from four sources determine that increased local ownership was a successful aspect of stakeholder coordination. The sources point to the improved engagement of local officials and community members and an increased sense of ownership among the Flood Task Force members. This ownership building was contributed to by different development actors through coordination and collaboration to enhance the local government's capacity and empower them to conduct risk analysis, weather forecasting, and information dissemination etc.

Stakeholder coordination of the Task Force with communities enabled successful mobilization (13 excerpts from 9 sources). The Flood Task Force was able to improve community awareness and engagement, in addition to improving community responses to early warning information, through coordinating with the local communities. Respondents mentioned the success of coordinating with Woreda- and Kebele-level administrators and community leaders. Local engagement enabled collaborative problem solving and widespread preparedness. Local engagement was also enhanced with support from the regional level.

Coordination Components

Planning was a key element of stakeholder coordination for the Flood Task Force (36 Excerpts from 17 sources). Much of the planning was led by government officials on the ECC, Flood Task Force, or sectoral offices and was supported by development partners. Stakeholders involved in the efforts include the government (at all levels), community leaders, development partners, meteorology experts, the private sector, volunteers, and the general public. In preparation for the 2021 flood season, Task Force stakeholders participated in scenario planning, and at the community level, partners identified vulnerable households and possible relocation locations. Similarly, 20 excerpts from 15 sources determine that allocation of funds was a crucial part of coordinated planning. Working with other stakeholders on the Task Force to plan funding distribution helped reduce activity and implementation duplication. Respondents noted that creating coordinated plans helped maximize the contributions of all stakeholders and incorporate evidence and learnings into decision-making.

The sources identify that Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) approaches were part of the stakeholder coordination process (23 excerpts from 9 sources). This included a DRM research partnership with universities, assessments, generating information, incorporating feedback into plans, and identifying lessons learned. Moreover, eight excerpts from seven sources identified MEL approaches as a successful and helpful part of stakeholder coordination. Specifically, respondents noted scenario planning, stakeholder mapping, joint assessments, assessments for flood vulnerability, and learning from past years as enabling for coordination of stakeholders. Evidence of adaptations based on learnings in the 2021 season response was seen in the re-establishment of the ECCs at all levels, and the early warning committees use of emergent meteorological information.

Clear and effective communication was critical to the Flood Task Force's successful coordination (19 excerpts from 15 sources). Each ECC meeting involved report-backs of current information and status updates of implementation efforts with all present stakeholders. Also, the Flood Task Force encouraged knowledge sharing and skill transfer between members. One RiPA North respondent noted, *"At the ECC at the regional level all the implementing partners in the region share and provide updates. That platform helped to relate with each other."* Relatedly, five excerpts from five sources stated that coordinating the early warning advisories and action was successful in disseminating the information through various methods of communication. The Flood Task Force and other partners used radio, television, community leaders (using Dagu system), and megaphones (vehicle-mounted megaphones shared the information at public gatherings and meeting places, market areas, and public work gatherings) as means of sharing the early warning Information.

Coordination Issues

When the community did not accept local authorities due to a lack of community trust in Flood Task Force stakeholders, it threatened the success of flood-related activities (4 excerpts from 4 sources). A Community Leader pointed out that *"People were not trusting authority from the regional and Woreda government due to political-ideological differences and good governance issues."* In some communities, the residents did not trust the messaging and guidance of the Flood Task Force and were resistant to relocation. It was difficult in some cases for the Flood Task Force to convince the communities to take action. Relatedly, four excerpts from four sources noted that there was a disconnect between the culture of the local community and the coordination strategy of the Flood Task Force.

16 excerpts from 14 sources (all stakeholder groups, less households, plus 3 ECC minutes) indicated that insufficient resources were a challenge for coordination among stakeholders on the Flood Task Force. There was also mention that the Task Force did not sufficiently coordinate early warning activities, costing more money in the long run by needing to implement expensive recovery efforts. Relatedly, eight excerpts from six sources criticized the slow bureaucracy that, for donors, delayed funds, and for the government, delayed decisions and necessary documentation.

Despite many successes in improving stakeholder engagement, coordination, and communication, evidence demonstrates there is still room for improvement and that remaining communication challenges can inhibit coordination (18 excerpts from 13 sources). Respondents felt that the Flood Task Force and other official government bodies concerned with DRM did not sufficiently coordinate with each other. One government respondent noted that, *"The Task Force commitment had some gaps. So, it is good to have better initiation and commitment in the Task Force in the future response efforts. There should be integration between Woreda Management and Administration Office in the Task Force."* Relatedly, some respondents did not feel there was sufficient communication around what the Flood Task Force was working on (8 excerpts from 7 sources), which led to a lack of awareness on how some stakeholders could contribute. One Private Sector respondent said, *"The Task Force does not have integration and they didn't told us their objectives specifically."*

Some stakeholders also lacked commitment (11 excerpts from 7 sources). The respondents articulated the poor commitment as an issue when the GOE had other priorities, when donors and the government were reluctant to commit resources, and when there was unequal buy-in from partners. There was a concern that not all stakeholders appreciated the extent of the flood risk and that donors prioritized efforts to implement aid operations in other regions of Ethiopia. Respondents noted that the GOE did not commit the necessary resources to the Flood Task Force. One Community Leader said, *"Starting from the assignment of people to the Task Force, the system has problems. Many of them are not committed. It needs budget and attention from the regional level."* Similarly, some respondents highlighted the inaction of the Flood Task Force, feeling the Flood Task Force had been negligent and did not sufficiently work with local communities and other concerned stakeholders, which may speak to some communities not properly receiving early warning information or being included in the response strategies (7 excerpts from 7 sources).

EQ2 Conclusions

The Afar regional ECC successfully brought stakeholders together for collective action on the 2021 kiremt season flooding. Leveraging the complementary ECC and Flood Task Force platforms, the Government of Ethiopia played a stronger leadership role in planning and implementation, utilizing other stakeholders' technical support and resources. All levels of the government were involved in the Task Force, from Federal to Kebele, though the regional government officials were the key leaders and the Woreda-level officials were essential for coordinating with local communities and actors. Development partners were also critical actors, bolstering resource

provision and technical assistance needed to plan and carry out the emergency response efforts. Lastly, local committees and 'clusters' are further examples of the inclusive environment of the Flood Task Force and reflect its work towards community engagement. These local or sector-based groups coordinated with the Flood Task Force and were directly involved in the on-the-ground implementation of Task Force efforts. Incorporating these groups into the Flood Task Force operations helps build local capacity and ownership.

Respondents felt that the Flood Task Force was particularly effective in 2021: it successfully incorporated partners from all levels and sectors, coordinated action through clear communication and regular meetings, efficiently informed local communities, and raised awareness of early warning and flood prevention efforts.

Local community participation, coordination, and engagement throughout the process, from planning to response implementation, were essential to any success seen in the 2021 Flood Task Force response. The Flood Task Force's efforts aimed to prepare and/or relocate flood-prone communities, so obtaining the local leaders' and households' buy-in was essential to activate early action. When the trust was not achieved, it significantly hindered the Flood Task Force's efforts to mitigate suffering. Including community leaders in planning processes is one method for improving ownership and buy-in, and with the support of community leaders, the Task Force can more easily communicate with and convince households. Intentional capacity building of Task Force members and local stakeholders also enables improved ownership and sustainability.

Planning is an essential part of the coordination efforts of the stakeholders on the Flood Task Force. Coordinated planning with all stakeholders helps to ensure that each is being maximally utilized and clarifies roles and responsibilities. Also, by incorporating evidence into planning and decision-making, plans can be more impactful and build upon lessons learned from past experiences.

EQ2 Recommendations

1. Emergency responses should leverage the example of GOE leadership in the 2021 Afar Flood Task Force response, as well as the learnings from effective ECC utilization, to increasingly lean on GOE regional or sub-regional offices for leadership and coordination of responses across development actors-- deduplicating the multitude of emergency response platforms that exist in favor of heavier reliance on ECCs where they have been set up. Additionally, response plans should better leverage the input and expertise of the sector-based offices for more holistic and sustainable support to relocated and displaced households. And, local committees must be engaged through these platforms in DRM planning and emergency response, amongst other stakeholder coordination to ensure community-level early action.

2. A platform like the Flood Task Force is a rich environment for stakeholder engagement and cooperation, and it should be utilized for more truly collaborative activity design and implementation. A focus on space for collaboration, where stakeholders co-create ideas that have a collective impact, should be successful in this environment and would improve outcomes, stakeholder buy-in, and local ownership.

3. It is also important that the DRM activities (continue to) include all stakeholders involved in the implementation throughout the planning and design processes. This will help ensure clear roles and ownership.

4. DRM stakeholders must continue to build engagement and trust with local communities, especially through open communication, accountability, and active involvement of community leaders through all steps of preparation, triggering a response, and response implementation, which will lead to improved outcomes and more sustainability of the efforts.

5 Approaches such as stakeholder mapping, assessments, and adaptive management should be incorporated into proactive, inclusive planning and the support development partners provide to the Flood Task Force. Building local stakeholders' capacity to utilize data and make informed adaptations will improve the impact and sustainability of the flood prevention and recovery efforts.

6 Clear communication is necessary for Flood Task Force and any disaster response operations. It must include regular sharing of information, alignment of implementation plans, distribution and mobilization of resources, and appropriately informing and preparing local communities. It is also essential that communications with local communities are written in an easy-to-understand format, translated into Afari, and disseminated using various modern and traditional methods.

7 While stakeholder coordination is a strength of the Flood Task Force, there is still room for improvement. There remain occasional challenges with ensuring consistent cooperation and commitment from all Task Force members. Communication from the Task Force to local communities also needs to be improved in the future to more cohesively reach all communities that are affected by flooding. DRM stakeholders should maintain communications with partners in the off-season and focus on building familiarity and cooperative processes early in operations. They should also seek to improve the related coordination approaches of well-informed planning, clear roles and responsibilities, and strong leadership. Informants specifically identified that government sector offices, Woreda administration officials, and Private Sector actors could be better integrated into the work of the Task Force.

Why did some households choose to relocate while others did not? (EQ3)

Households that relocated ahead of the 2021 flood decided to do so for a few key reasons. According to relocated households and Community Leader informants (27 excerpts from 21 sources), household wellbeing (e.g. their desire to save their lives, prevent property damage, and save their livestock) was the most prominent reason why they decided to relocate ahead of the flood (10 sources). This is followed by wanting to avoid the experience of the adverse effects of past floods (5 sources), receiving direct communication from government officials to relocate (4 sources), or early warning information (3 sources). Other stated reasons included the seasonal situation, food, and safety incentives.

Households that did not relocate ahead of the 2021 flood and community leaders shared several key reasons why they decided not to relocate (40 excerpts from 19 sources). The most cited reason was their perception that the flood would not affect their village nor be severe enough to warrant relocating (10 sources). For some, this decision was informed by their experience of not being affected by other floods in the past (3 sources). Other notable reasons why households did not relocate included their concern about not having a place to move to if they did relocate (5 sources) and fear or uncertainty about where they would relocate (4 sources). Relatedly, some expressed that the government did not support them in relocating ahead of the flood (4 sources), or they did not feel confident about receiving food or shelter at the relocation site (3 sources). As one household that did not relocate said, *"If I [relocate], my house and life will become challenging in a new place. There is not sufficient food nor support in the new place because our farm and source of food remain in this village."* Another household reiterated this concern, sharing, *"We did relocate but returned back because when we went there, there was no farmland. If we stay in our land we can do farming activity."* Others also mentioned not seeing a reason to relocate or admitted negligence (5 sources).

A number of households that were classified as "households that relocated" in all three Woredas (Afambo, Dubti, Asayita) were actually displaced by the flood when it arrived or evacuated after the flood via air transport, rather than willingly relocating before the flood (8 excerpts from 7 sources (households that relocated and community leaders)).

Stakeholders Perceptions versus Household Decision Making Factors

Flood Task Force stakeholders' perceptions of why households relocated are sometimes accurate and sometimes do not represent household decision-making factors. ARFTF stakeholders correctly identified that households' experience with past flood damage (21 excerpts from 14 sources), households' response to early warning information (19 excerpts from 11 sources), households' interest in preserving their wellbeing (10 excerpts from 9 sources), households' response to official relocation efforts (6 excerpts from 6 sources), and households' fear of a severe flood (3 excerpts from 3 sources) motivated relocation. However, the cultural assumptions around why households relocated given by ARFTF stakeholders were not mentioned by households-- e.g., religious beliefs, pastoralist traditions, and dependency on other families.

Similarly, for households that did not relocate, some ARFTF stakeholder perceptions aligned, while others differed. For example, there was a shared understanding of households' fear that the relocation site would not meet their needs (8 excerpts from 7 sources); and that they experienced logistical difficulties (3 excerpts from 3 sources). In addition, stakeholders perceived households' assumption that the flood would not be severe enough to require relocation or that it might not occur in their village (7 excerpts from 7 sources). However, stakeholders also believed that households were either unwilling to relocate (10 excerpts from 10 sources); that there were cultural reasons for why they did not relocate (6 excerpts from 5 sources); and that they distrusted the early warning information they received (3 excerpts from 3 sources), which did not accurately reflect households motivators for not relocating.

What role did early warning information have in household decision-making? (EQ3ai)

Additional evidence from 23 excerpts from 14 households and Community Leader informants identified that the effective communication of early warning information and advisory messages played an important role in households' decision to relocate. This includes communications that households received from the government (5 excerpts from 4 sources) and their community (3 excerpts from 3 sources). Moreover, the communications' focus on the relocation of households (5 excerpts from 5 sources) and its timely delivery (3 excerpts from 3 sources) were highlighted by households and community leaders as effective in facilitating household decision-making around relocation. Households who relocated early (4 sources) and those that did not (5 sources) both shared that they considered the early warning information they received as a motivating factor when deciding whether or not to relocate.

In contrast to those who received early warning information, 12 excerpts from 10 sources (including households that relocated (5), households that didn't relocate (3), and community leaders (2)) shared that they did not receive early warning information. This led to households not knowing where they could relocate. It should be noted that some households that did relocate (7 excerpts from 6 households) shared that they either did not receive any early warning information to do so (4 sources) or that if they did, other factors played a more important role in their decision to relocate (e.g., the reality on the ground or problems with the grass for their animals) (2 sources). Furthermore, six excerpts from five sources shared that the early warning information they received was insufficient. Most notably, some early warning information received by households lacked specific details on where to relocate, or the instructions they received were too general (e.g., being told to leave the lowland area and go to a general upward area), which led them to not move. As one household who did not relocate said, *"we heard through the radio they said to relocate, but we told them since we dont have place to relocate, how can we move?"*

Stakeholders' perception of the role of EWI on household decision-making is mixed. Four excerpts from four sources described how the sharing information, particularly early warning messages, worked well to coordinate awareness within the communities about flood incidence and preparation for relocation. However, some perceived that households did not relocate for reasons related to early warning information (4 excerpts from 4 sources), including not being told to relocate, a lack of awareness about the flood, the reality of what households see overpowering any early warning information they receive, and a distrust in the early warning information because it is a mix of traditional and scientific.

What influence did the results of past flood seasons have on households' decision this most recent kiremt flood season? (EQ3aii)

The results of past flood seasons influenced people both to relocate and not relocate ahead of the flood. Concerning those who were influenced to move as a result of past floods, 'negative effects from past floods' was the second most mentioned reason for why households decided to relocate ahead of the 2021 flood (6 excerpts from 5 sources) behind household wellbeing (i.e., their desire to save their lives, prevent property damage, save their livestock, etc.) (10 excerpts from 10 sources). Specifically, households mentioned their desire to save their lives and assets ahead of the 2021 flood after having seen or experienced damage from past floods. One household who decided to relocate reflected on their experience saying, *"I had lost 3 camels and more than 20 goats in the previous flood due to my delay in my decision to relocate. After that, I quickly decided [to relocate early] when the government alerted us about the flood."* Furthermore, three excerpts from three household sources mention that surviving the flood damage in 2020 was a major reason to decide to relocate in 2021.

For those who were not motivated to move due to past floods, some households referenced their experience of having moved to relocation sites in the past but not receiving sufficient livelihood support once there (3 excerpts from 3 sources). As a household that did not relocate shared, *"people prefer to face the flood challenge instead of going to a new place and suffering, many people will tell you how they suffered after they decided to relocate."* This was echoed by a Community Leader who said, *"I remember three years ago people relocated. Then the government did not provide support until they went back home. We suffered food and shelter shortages. Our children were infected by malaria at the time but not treated timely. All of this makes people fearful to relocate."*

In contrast to those who had negative experiences relocating in the past, other households that did not relocate shared that they assumed they would not be affected by the flood based on their experience of not being affected by floods in years past (3 excerpts from 3 sources). As one household who did not relocate said, *"Some years, flooding did not affect our village. That is something that made me hesitate about relocating."*

What was the experience of the communities who relocated because of the flood warnings compared to those who decided to stay put? (EQ3b)

EQ3b Findings

Experience of Those Who Relocated

Communities who relocated because of the flood warnings experienced two key benefits: 1) saving of their lives and assets (5 excerpts from 5 sources), and 2) reduced damage to assets (4

excerpts from 3 sources). For those who experienced saved lives and/or assets, making the relocation decision at the right time was vital (3 excerpts from 3 sources). As one household who relocated said, *"I was one of the households that decided to relocate because of information I got through Woreda Water Office and Kebele leaders. I relocated on time and was able to save my livestock and family's livelihood."*

However, households who relocated because of the flood warnings also experienced several drawbacks. To begin with, seven excerpts from five sources noted that the floods damaged the livelihoods of the communities in the flood-affected areas during the 2021 kiremt season. It caused the loss of assets such as crops, livestock, and other properties, which could have been sources of income for households. Also, the relocated people did not expect nor understand that relocation would stop their farming activities and they would lose everything in their original home. As one household respondent who relocated stated, *"Now, we have nothing that can support our life. All our food, onions, maize and others were damaged during the flood."* The respondents are now reliant on government support and are still suffering from a lack of food and supplies. In this same vein, five excerpts from three sources explained that the flood damage made them lose everything they had and left them empty-handed. *"We lost our livestock and properties, and we are here with empty hands, so we are in the worst situation."* Relatedly, some households that relocated shared that, for many people, household relocation resulted in both hunger and death from starvation (4 excerpts from 4 sources). When explaining why this hunger happened, three households mentioned that either the government stopped its food support or never even started it. Furthermore, nine excerpts from seven sources highlighted the long-lasting damage to households and villages that kept them from returning. These respondents also criticized the government and the Flood Task Force for lacking long-term support for the relocated households.

Experience of Those Who Did Not Relocate

Some households that did not relocate before the flood reported no change in their life and a return to their previous location as their informal relocation site was not far from their original home (4 excerpts from 3 sources). Households that did not relocate also experienced many drawbacks (7 excerpts from 7 sources), such as displacement (3 excerpts from 3 sources), food insecurity, flood damage and loss, lack of clean water and sanitation, etc. One household that did not relocate said, *"[My life is] getting worse. The flood diminished our goats and livestock, diseases comes out from water kills our goats. We are still living by the help of neighbors since our crops and everything else were lost."* Relatedly, nine households that did not relocate mentioned significant flood damage, including lost lives, houses, livestock, assets, and incomes. One household respondent who did not relocate said, *"Our properties were completely destroyed. A lot of organizations come here to mitigate the crisis but, so far nothing has improved."*

EQ3 Conclusions

In general, stakeholders have a very good understanding of why households decided to relocate or not ahead of the flood. However, there is a data quality issue that many households who were considered to "have relocated" actually moved either during or after the flood out of necessity, rather than the proactive reasons ARFTF stakeholders believed. Stakeholders also identified additional perceived reasons why households did not relocate, which the households themselves did not note (e.g., an unwillingness to relocate, cultural reasons, and distrust of EW information).

Households are primarily motivated to relocate to preserve their lives and belongings and avoid the negative experiences they have had during past floods. Meanwhile, reasons why households decided not to relocate reflected a lack of awareness of the severity of the flood, but also more saliently, a lack of awareness of a relocation site, and/or the site's services, which inhibited them from making an informed decision about whether or not to relocate.

EWI efficacy in influencing households' decision-making to relocate ahead of the flood greatly improves when 1) it is coupled with community awareness efforts, 2) it is delivered in a timely way (e.g., at least two weeks in advance) and 3) it is focused on the relocation of households with specific relocation center details. While some highlighted broad access to early warning information, there were still large pockets of people who did not receive early warning information from the Flood Task Force.

The influence of past flood seasons on households' decision to relocate in 2021 is mixed. While some households decided to relocate ahead of the 2021 kirmet season flood as a result of having seen or experienced negative effects from past floods (e.g., near loss of life, loss of livestock, property damage, etc), others decided to not relocate as a result of their problematic experience having moved to relocation sites in the past and not receiving sufficient livelihood support once there, or not being affected by past floods and believing that would be the case for 2021 too. As such, past flood seasons influence households' decisions both to relocate and not relocate.

In addition to households who benefited from relocation, many relocated households indicated a lack of support and difficult conditions at the relocation sites. While they may be alive, many of them lost their entire livelihoods, have still not returned to their original location, and are now dependent on the government for food and supplies. Many people are suffering from hunger and even death from starvation, which begs the question of whether households are better off if they decide to relocate ahead of the flood per the Flood Task Force's guidance or not?

EQ3 Recommendations

1. Flood prevention stakeholders should focus on future PSP advisories and EW messages on how relocation can preserve lives and property, to reflect households' interest in protecting their wellbeing. Additionally, more extensive messaging that includes clear relocation center information will help reach more at-risk households with clear and accessible information to help households make an informed decision about whether or not to relocate.

2. RiPA North, the Flood Task Force, and other disaster prevention stakeholders must clearly define "households that relocated" and improve data reliability, as the accuracy of this classification is important to the collection and reporting of data and, more importantly, to understanding the efficacy or potential lessons learned of climate shock responses.

3. Future flood prevention efforts, and any climate shock preparatory efforts, must ensure their early warning information is coupled with community awareness efforts; is delivered frequently and in a timely way (e.g., at least 2 weeks in advance); and is focused on the relocation of households. This responsibility should be coordinated between those with the most accurate and/or consolidated EWI and those with trusted communication channels to at-risk communities.

4. Climate shock preparation and response actors must design targeted and hyper-localized early warning information and/or community awareness campaigns to be as effective as possible. For example, if a specific area was not affected by the flood in the past and is forecasted to be affected in the coming flood season, it is important that the EWI acknowledge this as part of their tailored communications to help communities understand that even though the flood didn't happen in their area last year, it is forecasted to affect them this year, and they should move to avoid any severe damage from the upcoming flood. Likewise, for households that are reluctant to move because their needs were not met in the past, community leaders should be engaged in determining the resources available at relocation centers so they can encourage households in their area and address concerns about the adequacy of the relocation site to meet their needs.

5 The Flood Task Force, USAID, and others supporting climate shock responses should examine the situation of those who relocated to relocation sites in this Afar case study and other recent relocation efforts to better understand relocated households' realities on the ground. From there, the Flood Task Force should 1) mobilize and deploy the needed resources to remediate any current suffering; 2) review the plan that details the envisioned support to households that relocate and update it to ensure households that relocate will receive sufficient support in the future; and 3) ensure there is a plan in place to support long-term IDPs during the next flood season. Overarchingly, a deeper and expedited interrogation into relocation as a primary response mechanism is warranted ahead of anticipated climate shocks in Ethiopia to truly prevent and mitigate versus delay suffering and ensure the most effective use of limited response funds.

What financial factors and other contributions were important to the success of this flood response? (EQ4)

EQ4 Findings

Financial contributions from various sources were important to the success of the Afar flood response (22 excerpts from 16 sources). Specific stakeholders who contributed financially to the Flood Task Force include CARE, DPPC (Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), GIZ, Private Sector actors, and other NGOs. As highlighted in a secondary document, the financial contributions from other development partners and RiPA North (USAID) were 17% and 2% of the total funds used, respectively; however, these figures were not confirmed by other sources. RiPA North's financial contributions included funds to the Flood Task Force and cash transfers to MSEs in flood-affected Woredas (6 excerpts from 5 sources).

The financial resource contributions from all levels of the Government of Ethiopia were critical to the success of the Afar flood response (15 excerpts from 12 sources). Sources stated that most Flood Task Force funding came from the GOE. Respondents especially noted emergency funds for relocation and the funding for the Task Force as impactful. The ARFTF budget planning, led by the GOE and informed by local capacity assessments and action planning, also enabled successful operations by the Flood Task Force (9 excerpts from 9). Additionally, 10 excerpts from 10 sources mentioned a cost-savings motivation for the GOE to work on flood prevention efforts. Respondents generally noted the government's desire to avoid the costs of flood damage, especially because of the huge costs the previous year.

Resource availability was also an essential enabler of the Flood Task Force's effectiveness, particularly for pre-flood operations (19 excerpts from 16 sources). Specific resources mentioned were financial, shelter, food, boats, household utilities, human labor, and tools and materials. Respondents noted that these resources came from the government, communities, and development partners. Most sources mentioned that all contributions were helpful, with one Development Partner saying, *"All resources like human capital, logistics, money, etc from whoever was important for the success of the Flood Task Force efforts."* Relatedly, nine excerpts from eight sources (most stakeholder groups) observed that in-kind contributions from the government and other development partners helped enable pre-flood preparation efforts. This mainly involved food and shelter to support households in relocating. Additionally, including sectoral and technical experts was a helpful human resource for the pre-flood planning and mitigation operations (8 excerpts from 6 sources). This included meteorological, PSNP, DRM, and EW experts, who either helped inform the pre-flood strategy or participated in specific tasks as part of the Task Force's work. Furthermore, eight excerpts from five sources highlighted that access to evidence and data helped inform decision-making for successful operations.

Alternative trends identified a shortage of resources for the Flood Task Force during the 2021 operations and systemically for long-term flood damage reduction (17 excerpts from 13 sources). Specifically, the evidence noted that the short-term funding and temporary nature of the Flood Task Force created an inhibiting environment (12 excerpts from 10 sources), limiting the scope of the Task Force's implementations and impact. One RiPA North respondent said, *"The Regional DPP is taking the lead in relocating the communities, but with that situation sometimes; when relocating, there may not be enough facilities to move the people. The budget will not allow us to make all the required facilities."* Community members felt that the Flood Task Force operations were insufficient and that the government needed to take more permanent action to solve the recurring crisis. The view from respondents was that if there is more proactive government action, it will reduce costs and damage in the long run. Respondents' ideas for more permanent action included funding the construction on rivers, canals, streams, and channels and minimizing the flow of dams leading to the Awash River. Relatedly, 10 excerpts from 4 sources noted that a lack of technical capacity and skills (human resources) also inhibited the operations of the Flood Task Force. There was a lack of experience disseminating early warning information, inadequate training for community-level actors, a competency gap in the flood risk management committees, and a lack of technically-skilled actors to lead flood prevention and evacuation efforts.

EQ4 Conclusions

Development actors split the financial burden of the 2021 Afar flood response, with RiPA North playing a moderate role and the GOE, a more substantial role than past years. The GOE, ECC, and the Flood Task Force led, coordinated, and managed the financial resources together, creating an enabling environment for reducing resource duplication and using resources strategically.

A broad range of resources from the government, development partners, and communities enabled the implementation of the Flood Task Force's operations, particularly its pre-flood efforts. Of particular note is the value of evidence and technical expertise to inform quality pre-flood planning and decision-making for flood mitigation operations (e.g. identification of at-risk communities, development of EW information, etc,). However, efficiencies are lost with the ARFTF's focus on short-term funding and the temporary nature of the Flood Task Force, since funding for ARFTF operations is insufficient to meet immediate needs. There is great potential benefit in sufficiently addressing the infrastructure issues associated with the dam overflowing each year. If it can be resolved, it would prevent the need for the ARFTF to facilitate household relocation and temporary housing/support each year. Lastly, the ARFTF's funding management needs strengthening (e.g., the structure of the Task Force's funding stream, a fund management system, and clear responsibilities around funding, technical capacity and skills, etc.) to ensure better and centralized management of ARFTF financial resources.

EQ4 Recommendations

1. Climate shock response efforts must be fully-funded. If they are not, the necessary support to vulnerable populations delays but does not necessarily prevent suffering, thereby making the effort an inefficient use of funds. In the near term, climate shock responses must be adequately funded through the humanitarian to development transition, but the Flood Task Force and USAID should explore long-term infrastructure solutions that will sufficiently address the flooding issue for decades to come.

2. Beyond acquiring additional funding for various response resources, a full-time Flood Task Force with multi-year funding should be considered to ensure sufficient funding and secure the technical and financial skills needed to effectively carry out many of the Flood Task Force's operations since the flood shock commonly occurs each year. The Flood Task Force and other climate shock efforts must actively engage meteorological data and experts throughout their planning and implementation processes. This should be appropriately budgeted for both financially and in workplanning to ensure timely flows of information that enable early action and adaptation as needed.

Consolidated and Prioritized Recommendations

The recommendations have been consolidated and prioritized from the sections above and sorted by the specific stakeholder best positioned to implement the recommendation and take the adaptive actions.

Critical Recommendation for All Involved in Climate Shock Response

All involved in climate shock responses should examine the situation of those who relocated to relocation sites in this Afar case study, as well as other recent relocation efforts, to better understand relocated households' realities on the ground and the disconnect between emergency response and durable solutions. For Afar specifically, the Flood Task Force should:

a. Mobilize and deploy the needed resources to remediate any current suffering;
b. Review the plan that details the envisioned support to households that relocate and update it to ensure households that relocate will receive sufficient support in the future; and
c. Ensure there is a plan in place to support long-term IDPs during the next flood season.

Overarchingly, a deeper and expedited interrogation into relocation as a primary response mechanism is warranted ahead of anticipated climate shocks in Ethiopia to truly prevent and mitigate versus delay the suffering of vulnerable populations and ensure the most effective use of limited response funds.

Flood Task Force Stakeholders Prioritized Recommendations

1. The Flood Task Force must build upon its approach to planning efforts to take an increasingly hyper-localized approach and ensure response design holistically considers what support households will need before, during, and after flooding. Response plans must consider strategies and mechanisms for supporting relocated IDPs when they are ready to return home, even if that requires coordination with other development actors and/or response platforms. All future climate shock response plans should start with the end in mind by identifying what success looks like, not just for the emergency response but the responses' connection back to development activities and support for more sustainable handovers.

2. High levels of engagement and commitment from stakeholders through a mutually agreed upon terms of reference and established modes and frequency of communication should be a prerequisite to carrying out a response, since without this, Task Force operations are subject to not being completed as intended, and may even lead to harm as a result of gaps in services. They should also seek to improve the related coordination approaches of well-informed planning, clear roles and responsibilities, and strong leadership. Additionally, the ARFTF should continue to strengthen collaborative activity design and implementation to foster stakeholder engagement and cooperation that would improve outcomes, stakeholder buy-in, and local ownership.

3 The Flood Task Force, RiPA North, and other disaster prevention stakeholders must address and improve data reliability issues. They must clearly define "households that relocated" as the accuracy of this classification is important to the collection and reporting of data and, more importantly, to understanding the efficacy or potential lessons learned of climate shock responses.

Development Partners Operating in DRM and Climate Sectors Prioritized Recommendations

1 Emergency responses should leverage the example of GOE leadership in the 2021 Afar Flood Task Force response, as well as the learnings from effective ECC utilization, to increasingly lean on GOE regional or sub-regional offices for leadership and coordination of responses across development actors-- deduplicating the multitude of emergency response platforms that exist in favor of heavier reliance on ECCs where they have been set up. Additionally, response plans should better leverage the input and expertise of the sector-based offices for more holistic and sustainable support to relocated and displaced households. Local committees must also be engaged through these platforms in DRM planning and emergency response, amongst other stakeholder coordination to ensure community-level early action.

2 DRM stakeholders must continue to build engagement and trust with local communities, especially through open communication, accountability, and active involvement of community leaders through all steps of preparation, triggering a response, and response implementation, which will lead to improved outcomes and more sustainability of the efforts. Clear communication is necessary for Flood Task Force and any disaster response operations. It must include regular sharing of information, alignment of implementation plans, distribution and mobilization of resources, and appropriately informing and preparing local communities. It is also essential that communications with local communities are written in an easy-to-understand format, translated into Afari, and disseminated using various modern and traditional methods.

3 Climate shock response efforts must use a hyper-localized approach in the identification and design of approaches and implementation channels, to achieve community awareness and early action. This should include locale-specific early warning messages shared through trusted community leaders and other local communication networks, as well as an improved understanding of the motivators, cultural implications, and alternative local solutions to broader relocation efforts. Longer-term trust-building between the GOE and communities, especially at a local level, will also improve disaster risk management and reduction. Flood prevention stakeholders should focus on future PSP advisories and EW messages on how relocation can preserve lives and property to reflect households' interest in protecting their wellbeing. Additionally, more extensive messaging that includes clear relocation center information will help reach more at-risk households with clear and accessible information to help households make an informed decision about whether or not to relocate. The early warning information should be coupled with community awareness efforts; delivered frequently and in a timely way (e.g., at least two weeks in advance); and focused on the relocation of households. This responsibility should be coordinated between those with the most accurate and/or consolidated EWI and those with trusted communication channels to at-risk communities.

Government of Ethiopia Stakeholders Prioritized Recommendations

1. Government of Ethiopia stakeholders should continue to fund and lead the flood prevention and recovery efforts, in coordination with development partners, specifically for the Afar Flood Task Force ahead of each kiremt season. By funding the Flood Task Force, the government promoted flood efforts as a shared burden. The government should continue and increase funding for prevention efforts to avoid more costly recovery efforts.

2. Beyond acquiring additional funding for various response resources, a full-time Flood Task Force with multi-year funding should be considered to ensure sufficient funding and secure the technical and financial skills needed to effectively carry out many of the Flood Task Force's operations since the flood shock commonly occurs each year. The Flood Task Force and other climate shock efforts must actively engage meteorological data and experts throughout their planning and implementation processes. This should be appropriately budgeted for both financially and in workplanning to ensure timely flows of information that enable early action and adaptation as needed.

Joint GOE, USAID, and Other Donors Prioritized Recommendations

1. Climate shock response efforts must be fully-funded. If they are not, the necessary support to vulnerable populations delays but does not necessarily prevent suffering, thereby making the effort an inefficient use of funds. In the near term, climate shock responses must be adequately funded through the humanitarian to development transition, but the Flood Task Force and USAID should explore long-term infrastructure solutions that will sufficiently address the flooding issue in the future.

2. The EDRMC must enforce accountability of government performance at every level of emergency response operations to ensure consistent buy-in and performance in carrying out all climate shock responses. This may require additional capacity building and coordination, which can be supported by USAID Activities such as DRM-CB/BRE, NIMS, and PYL and through multi-stakeholder engagement and mutual accountability through coordination platforms like the Afar Flood Task Force.

Additional Resources

- Data Collection Instrument
- Secondary Document Overview
- Mapping Exercise of Evaluation Questions to the *Case Study of the 2021 Afar Region Flood Response (produced by Mercy Corps and CARE)*

For any further questions about this case study or the SDRM-SI DE, please contact:

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